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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Appellant Richard Pokorney (hereinafter Mr. Pokorney and/or Appellant) 
appeals from convictions following a jury trial on two counts of lewd conduct. 
This trial occurred after a remand following reversal due to I.R.E. 404(b) error. 
Appellant asserts that 1) the district court erred by failing to appoint 
substitute counsel, or, in the alternative, by failing to have a sufficient hearing 
regarding Mr. Pokorney's request for substitute counsel; 2) there was insufficient 
evidence to support his convictions; and 3) his Sixth Amendment rights were 
violated when the district court refused to allow him to recall and impeach 
witnesses. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
This case has a long history beginning with a jury trial, a reversal on 
appeal, and another jury trial following remand. As concisely explained by the 
Court of Appeals in the prior appeal, State v. Pokorney, 149 Idaho 459 (Ct App. 
2010): 
Pokorney and his wife, LG., have five sons whose ages at the time 
of trial were: J.G., age twenty-three; R.D.P., age seventeen; W.P., 
age twelve; R.P., age nine; and J.P., age five. Stemming from the 
allegations of four of his five sons, Pokorney was charged with 
seven counts of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen. R.D.P. 
made no allegation of misconduct. The State's case included direct 
testimony of lewd conduct from J.G., W.P., and R.P. The youngest 
son, J.P., took the stand but did not testify to any misconduct.n1 
FOOTNOTES 
n1 Two of the charges were based on conduct against J.P., one 
charge was dismissed and the jury acquitted Pokorney on the other 
charge. 
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Prior to trial, the State notified Pokorney that it intended to present 
evidence of a prior bad act pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b). Pokorney had 
been convicted in Montana in 1984 of sexual conduct with a minor, 
involving B.W. as a victim. The evidence proposed by the State 
included a letter written by Pokorney, while he was in jail on 
charges of domestic violence, to his son R.D.P. In the letter, 
Pokorney denied the lewd conduct allegations in this case and, 
among other things, attempted to explain Pokorney's crime against 
B.W. The evidence proposed by the State also included testimony 
from B.W. Over objection from Pokorney, the district court allowed 
presentation of the evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b). In its case-in-
chief, the State introduced portions of the letter and the testimony 
ofB.W. 
The jury convicted Pokorney of five counts of lewd conduct 
against J.G., W.P., and R.P., and the district court imposed unified 
sentences of life with thirty years determinate on each count to run 
concurrently. Pokorney appeals. 
Id. p. 461. 
The Court of Appeals reversed pursuant to State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49 
(2009), and State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664 (2010). The Court of Appeals 
found that while the challenged evidence was relevant to demonstrate 
consciousness of guilt, the district court erred in its I.R.E. 403 analysis because 
the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the risk of 
unfair prejudice. Since the error was not harmless, the judgment was vacated 
and the case remanded for further proceedings. Pokorney, p. 466. 
In the original trial in 2007, Mr. Pokorney made many complaints against 
his public defender, but the court refused to appoint a substitute attorney. In the 
middle of the 2007 jury trial, Mr. Pokorney discharged him and proceeded prose. 
Back in the district court following the issuance of the opinion of the Court 
of Appeals, the district court appointed the same public defender who had 
previously been discharged by Mr. Pokorney, and Mr. Pokorney repeatedly 
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requested substitute counsel, which the court again refused. (R. p. 25, 49, 58, 
65.) Mr. Pokorney again discharged that attorney and proceeded to jury trial pro 
se rather than be represented by that particular attorney. (R. p. 65-66.) 
The jury found Mr. Pokorney guilty of two counts of lewd conduct and 
hung on another three counts of lewd conduct. (R. p. 195-196.) The state 
dismissed these later three counts without prejudice. (R. p. 197, 199.) 
The court sentenced Mr. Pokorney to life in prison with the 'first 30 years 
fixed on each of the two counts of conviction, to run concurrent. (R. p. 371.) 
Mr. Pokorney timely appeals. (R. p. 374, 378.) 
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ISSUES 
I. 
WHETHER APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAS VIOLATED WHEN THE 
COURT REFUSED TO APPOINT SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL RESULTING IN MR. 
POKORNEY PROCEEDING PRO SE, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, WHETHER 
THE COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO HOLD A SUFFICIENT HEARING 
11. 
WHETHER THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
CONVICTIONS 
111. 
WHETHER THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO ALLOW MR. 
POKORNEY TO RECALL AND IMPEACH WITNESSES 
4 
ARGUMENT 
L 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO APPOINT 
SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE COURT ERRED 
WHEN IT FAILED TO HOLD A PROPER HEARING IN RESPONSE TO MR. 
POKORNEY'S REQUEST FOR SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL 
A Introduction 
In the original trial proceedings, Mr. Pokorney repeatedly complained 
about his public defender and wanted a different one appointed. The court would 
not appoint anyone different, so during the middle of the first jury trial, Mr. 
Pokorney discharged his counsel and proceeded pro se. 
After the convictions were vacated and the matter remanded, the district 
court appointed the same attorney whom Mr. Pokorney had earlier discharged. 
Mr. Pokorney again objected and requested substitute counsel. Since the court 
would not appoint anyone different, Mr. Pokorney again discharged his counsel 
and proceeded to jury trial pro se. 
First, the district court erred by failing to appoint substitute counsel after 
ruling (regarding Mr. Pokorney's allegations about his counsel) "taking every bit 
of it as true, I cannot find there is a basis to remove [attorney] as your appointed 
counsel." Since those allegations included intentional sabotage and collusion 
with the prosecutor, if they were true they would obviously require substitute 
counsel. 
5 
Second, the court cut off any further discussion on the allegations by 
ruling that even if the allegations were true they did not constitute good cause. 
Thus, in the event the court really did not take the allegations as true, then it 
deprived Mr. Pokorney of his full and fair opportunity to present his complaints. 
Third, the court also erred because it used the wrong standard to 
determine whether new counsel needed to be appointed due to an irrevocable 
breakdown of communication between the attorney and the defendant. Since the 
court used the wrong standard, that in itself is an abuse of discretion. 
B. Standard of review 
As the Court of Appeals explained in State v. Upperl, 276 P.3d 756 (Ct. 
App. 2012): 
Finally, the decision of whether to appoint substitute counsel lies 
within the discretion of the trial court and will only be reviewed for 
an abuse of discretion. When a trial court's discretionary decision is 
reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered 
inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived 
the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted 
within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any 
legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) 
whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of 
reason. 
Id., p. 759. 
C. Mr. Pokorney's complaints about his attorney and the court's rulings 
As explained above, in the original trial, after the court refused Mr. 
Pokorney's (repeated) requests to appoint substitute counsel, he discharged the 
attorney in the middle of trial and proceeded prose. 
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Upon remand, the district court appointed the same attorney Mr. Pokorney 
had earlier discharged. Mr. Pokorney again objected, and the court refused to 
appoint substitute counsel, so Mr. Pokorney again discharged his counsel and 
proceeded pro se. The dispute over substitute counsel can best be described as 
a running battle between the court and Mr. Pokorney, with the issue arising over 
and over again in almost every hearing. 
To begin with, at a hearing held on June 3, 2010 (shortly after the opinion 
in the first appeal issued), the court purported to appoint the same public 
defender (who will simply be referred to as "attorney"). (Tr. 6/3/2010, p. 5-6. 1) 
Due to a pending Petition for Review filed by the state (ultimately denied), 
several months went by before the remittitur issued and the first time the case 
was officially back before the district court was at a hearing held on August 12, 
2010. (Tr. 8/12/2010, p. 5, 7.) The attorney was never actually reappointed at 
this time.2 
At the hearing on August 12, 2010, Mr. Pokorney moved for a different 
attorney to be appointed, in particular, one from outside the public defender's 
office, based on ineffective assistance of counsel, obstruction, denial of 
evidence, willful sabotage, etc. (Tr. 8/12/2012, p. 8.) Mr. Pokorney was 
1 Since many transcripts in the instant record were prepared based on motions to 
augment, the original main volume will be designated "Tr." and the other 
transcripts will be designated by the hearing date. 
2 This led to repeated complaints by Mr. Pokorney that the first reappointment in 
June was invalid because at that time he was still represented by the State 
Appellant Public Defender. The district court never meaningfully addressed this 
complaint and just insisted that counsel had been appointed. (Tr. 8/20/2010, p. 
14; Tr. 9/24/2010, p. 7.) 
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instructed to write the court a letter outlining all of his concerns or problems and 
they would have a hearing on it. (Id., p. 9.) 
At the next hearing, held on August 20, 2010, Mr. Pokorney stated he had 
his letter with him, but had not understood he needed to earlier submit it to the 
court. (Tr. 8/20/2010, p. 13.) When the court asked to see the letter, Mr. 
Pokorney said he withdraws that and would like to assert his right to proceed pro 
se. (Id., p. 13.) The court clarified that Mr. Pokorney actually did want a lawyer, 
just not this particular one, and wanted conflict counsel from outside of the public 
defender's office. (Id., p. 14-15.) In response to the court's question, Mr. 
Pokorney agreed that he had a conflict with that attorney's representation of him. 
(Id., p. 15.) 
When asked, the attorney stated he did not have any conflict in terms of 
his ability to represent Mr. Pokorney as a zealous advocate. (Id., p. 16.) The 
attorney affirmed to the court that in his prior representations (presumably made 
regarding Mr. Pokorney's request for substitute counsel in the original 
proceedings) he had conducted discovery and investigated this case and had his 
investigator assist with this and was prepared to meet with Mr. Pokorney on a 
regular basis to prepare for trial. (Id., p. 16-17.) The court also noted that the 
reversal was based on that attorney's objection. (Id., p. 17.) 
Mr. Pokorney, on the other hand, stated that he had a conflict with the 
attorney, in that the attorney lied to him and threatened him. (Id., p. 17.) Mr. 
Pokorney described one specific threat, which the attorney denied. (Id., p. 18.) 
He described another threat which the attorney denied, and when he stated he 
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had lots more of them, the court stated that it had grave concerns about his 
grasp of reality and sua sponte ordered a competency evaluation. (Id., p. 19-20.) 
The next hearing was on September 24, 2010, which began with the court 
explaining that the evaluation had determined that Mr. Pokorney was competent 
to proceed. (Tr. 9/24/2010, p. 6.) 
The court then explained it had received two detailed letters of Mr. 
Pokorney's disagreements, concerns, and complaints regarding the attorney, one 
dated August 17, 2010, and one dated September 9, 2010.3 (Id.) The court 
asked whether he had any additional conflicts or any other information or other 
issues to present to the court, to which Mr. Pokorney responded he did, and, 
among other things, requested a copy of the order appointing the attorney. (Id., 
p. 7.) The court responded that it had appointed the attorney and continued the 
appointment after the remittitur had been received, and it was done in open 
court.4 
After some arguing between the court and Mr. Pokorney, the court again 
asked whether he had any additional allegations against the attorney other than 
those contained in the two letters, to which Mr. Pokorney answered, "[n]ot 
offhand, no." (Id., p. 8-9.) 
When asked if he wanted to respond to the August 17, 2010, letter (which 
had been addressed to him), the attorney said he did not and offered just a 
generalized response to both letters, to wit, he feels like he had done what he 
3 These letters are the subject of a contemporaneously filed motion to augment. 
4 The court was incorrect, it never appointed and/or continued the appointment 
after the remittitur issued. (Id., p. 7.) 
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was supposed to in his prior representation of Mr. Pokorney prior to being 
discharged. (/d., p. 9.) 
The ruling was follows: 
THE COURT: Again, based upon the representations that were 
made to the court earlier, and that was just shortly before the court 
requested that there be a mental health evaluation ... based upon 
the letters that I have reviewed, and keeping in mind it is the 
province and the duty of the court to review the allegations, I cannot 
find at this time that [attorney's] representation of Mr. Pokorney in 
the prior proceedings was deficient or was ineffective or was 
incompetent. In fact, to the contrary. 
I will also find that [attorney] does not have a conflict in 
representing Mr. Pokorney in future proceedings. It is clear from 
these letters that Mr. Pokorney has a conflict with [attorney] 
representing him. 
However, that's not the standard. The standard is. is there a conflict 
that would prevent counsel from representing a defendant, or have 
there been statements or actions by defense counsel that rise to 
the level that a defendant cannot, based upon those specific 
actions or comments-cannot have a level of confidence, a level 
of-well, the level of confidence in the defense counsel? 
By that, I mean, though I have reviewed all of these statements 
you've made, there is nothing in those that show to this court-
THE DEFENDANT: But-
THE COURT: Just let me finish. I'm making my ruling, Mr. 
Pokorney. That [attorney], either though statements made to you or 
actions taken by him, demonstrate any bias or prejudice against 
you, the crime that brings you before the court. 
So the option is this: If you would like to have an attorney represent 
you, if it's going to be an appointed attorney, it would be [attorney]. 
THE DEFENDANT: And that's not acceptable. 
THE COURT: Okay. Then if you would like to hire your own 
attorney, you can. If you cannot afford to hire an attorney, then I will 
go through a series of questions with you about representing 
yourself. 
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Tr. 9/24/2010, p. 9, In. 16-p. 11, In. 11 (emphasis added). 
The court confirmed that Mr. Pokorney did not want the attorney to 
represent him in a direct or standby capacity, and then the attorney was 
discharged. (Id., p. 12.) One significant exchange during the Faretta questioning 
was when the court advised him that a lawyer would potentially interview the 
State's witnesses, even those that may have a no contact order, Mr. Pokorney 
stated "[wJell, yeah, he could potentially do it, but he won't do it, so that's one of 
the reasons I don't just want him." Id. p. 16, In. 13-15. 
Later, Mr. Pokorney explained that he understood the danger of self 
representation, and he did not want to represent himself, rather, he wanted 
conflict assistance. (Id. p. 19.) Shortly thereafter, the following exchange took 
place: 
THE DEFENDANT: What I don't understand is why you don't 
appoint conflict assistance. 
THE COURT: Sometimes I don't articulate very well, Mr. Pokorney, 
but I found there is no basis for conflict counsel, based upon the 
totality-
THE DEFENDANT: I just-we didn't have a hearing. You read my 
letter but we never talked about it. 
THE COURT: I asked you if you had any additional matters that 
you wished to bring to the court's attention. 
THE DEFENDANT: I know, but we never talked about the matters 
that I did bring to your attention that were written in the letter. We 
were supposed to discuss why [attorney] didn't bring up the fact 
that a felony-
THE COURT: Sir, I read those letters. And taking every bit of it as 
true 1 I cannot find there is a basis to remove [attorney] as your 
appointed counsel. 
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THE DEFENDANT: Well, I -
THE COURT: That's my ruling. Now, I am not going to have any 
further discussion with you. I made my ruling, and if you choose to 
challenge that ruling, you are certainly welcome to do so with a 
higher court. Now-
THE DEFENDANT: And I will. 
Tr. 9/24/2010, p. 19, In. 25-p. 21, In. 2 (emphasis added). 
While they will not be belabored because the court never made any 
different ruling than the ones during the hearing of September 24, 2010, above, 
Mr. Pokorney renewed his request for conflict assistance at the pre-trial 
conference, on the first morning of the jury trial, at a post trial hearing on January 
12, 2010, and at his sentencing. Every time the court offered up the same 
attorney, and every time Mr. Pokorney refused him and continued to represent 
himself. (Tr. 12/15/2010, p. 18-19; Tr. p. 51-55; Tr. 1/12/2011, p. 25-26; Tr. 
4/13/2011, p. 7-8.) 
D. The court erred in denying Mr. Pokorney's request for substitute counsel 
As the Court of Appeals explained in State v. Lippert, 276 P.3d 756 (Ct. 
App. 2012): 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 
I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution guarantee the right to 
counsel. The right to counsel does not necessarily mean a right to 
the attorney of one's choice. Mere lack of confidence in otherwise 
competent counsel is not necessarily grounds for substitute counsel 
in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. However, for good 
cause a trial court may, in its discretion, appoint a substitute 
attorney for an indigent defendant. The trial court must afford the 
defendant a full and fair opportunity to present the facts and 
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reasons in support of a motion for substitution of counsel after 
having been made aware of the problems involved. 
The trial court must conduct a meaningful inquiry to determine 
whether a defendant possesses good cause for his or her request 
for substitute counsel. Specifically, the district court must make 
some reasonable, nonsuggestive efforts to determine the nature of 
the defendant's complaints and to apprise itself of the facts 
necessary to determine whether the defendant's relationship with 
his or her appointed attorney has deteriorated to the point that 
sound discretion requires substitution or even to such an extent that 
his or her Sixth Amendment right would be violated but for 
substitution. Even when the trial court suspects that the 
defendant's requests are disingenuous and designed solely to 
manipulate the judicial process and to delay the trial, perfunctory 
questioning is not sufficient. 
Good cause includes an actual conflict of interest; a complete, 
irrevocable breakdown of communication; or an irreconcilable 
conflict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict. Factors to be 
used in examining constitutional implications of a total breakdown 
in communication include: (1) whether the defendant's motion for 
new counsel was timely; (2) whether the trial court adequately 
inquired into defendant's reasons for making the motion; (3) 
whether the defendant-attorney conflict was so great that it led to a 
total lack of communication precluding an adequate defense; and 
(4) whether the defendant substantially and unreasonably 
contributed to the communication breakdown. United States v. Lott, 
310 F.3d 1231, 1250 (10th Cir. 2002} .... If good cause is shown, 
the defendant is constitutionally entitled to the appointment of new 
counsel. A defendant may not, however, manufacture good cause 
by abusive or uncooperative behavior. 
Id., p. 759 (emphasis added, internal citations omitted}. 
The Tenth Circuit case cited above, United States v. Lott, 310 F.3d 1231 
(10th Cir. 2002}, further explained why good cause is not limited to only the 
ineffective assistance of appointed counsel: 
"Even if a defendant's counsel is competent, a serious breakdown 
in communication can result in an inadequate defense." United 
States v. Musa, 220 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000}. A defendant 
who cannot communicate with his attorney cannot assist his 
attorney with preparation of his case, including suggesting potential 
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witnesses to call and trial strategies to pursue, discussing whether 
the defendant himself should testify, and helping formulate other 
bread-and-butter decisions that can constitute the core of a 
successful defense. A trial court's failure to appoint new counsel 
when faced with a total breakdown in communication may thus 
constitute a denial of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. 
Id., p. 1251 (footnote omitted).5 
In our case, the district court first erred by failing to appoint substitute 
counsel despite there being good cause to do so. The court held that even 
taking Mr. Pokorney's allegations about counsel as true, there was still no basis 
to remove the attorney. Specifically, the court again stated: "I read those letters. 
And taking every bit of it as true, I cannot find there is a basis to remove 
[attorney} as your appointed counsel." 
The first letter was addressed to the attorney and accused him of willful 
sabotage of Mr. Pokorney's case. Specifically mentioned was the attorney's 
willful obstruction of Mr. Pokorney's attempts to view evidence and the grand jury 
transcript, refusal to file requested relevant motions, collusion with the prosecutor 
as to jury selection, and threatening Mr. Pokorney and lying to him. (Letter, 
August 17, 2010, p. 1-2.) 
The second letter was addressed to the court, and, among other things, 
Mr. Pokorney provided specific examples of the ineffectiveness of his attorney. 
For example, Mr. Pokorney states that the attorney failed to investigate a crime 
committed by one of his accusers (J.G.) against Mr. Pokorney that would provide 
5 Lott explained that a Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), harmless error 
analysis applies and described the government's burden of proving a total 
communication breakdown to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as a 
substantial one. Lott, p. 1251. 
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motivation for a false accusation, and even failed to question that accuser about 
it at the first trial. (Letter, September 20, 2010, p. 5.) Mr. Pokorney complained 
that his attorney failed to file a motion to sever the charges that accused him of 
dissimilar crimes against different people separated by years. (Letter, September 
20, 2010, p. 5-6.) Also, he complained that there was a lack of investigation 
regarding the timing of initial allegations which directly affected the credibility of 
the allegations of the adult accusers. (Letter, September 20, 2010, p. 5-6.) 
According to the letter, no one was contacted on behalf of Mr. Pokorney and the 
jury did not hear from the other witnesses who could have testified that the 
allegations were actually made some five months earlier than was claimed at 
trial. (Letter, September 20, 2010, p. 6-7.) 
This letter continued by stating that the attorney refused to answer 
germane questions, refused to assist him with compulsory process, refused to 
allow him to see the grand jury transcript and all other evidence, and refused to 
turn over the files and evidence when he was relegated to an advisory role. 
(Letter, September 20, 2010, p. 8.) Further, the attorney intentionally misled him 
by telling him, for example, that he could not impeach the credibility of witnesses 
with out of court statements and that he could not move to dismiss for insufficient 
evidence before appeal. (Letter, September 20, 2010, p. 8.) Mr. Pokorney 
stated the attorney verbally threatened him. (Letter, September 20, 2010, p. 8.) 
The letter continued by stating the attorney has evidence of fabrication 
and willfully suppressed it. (Letter, September 20, 2010, p. 9.) Finally, Mr. 
Pokorney stated that the public defender's office colluded with the prosecutor's 
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office to keep him incarcerated on a domestic violence misdemeanor while the 
instant investigation was conducted. (Letter, September 20, 2010, p. 9.) 
This issue here is not the validity of these allegations because the court 
ruled that even taking every bit of them as true they did not constitute good 
cause for substitute counsel. That is of course incorrect -- lying, threatening, 
and colluding is more than enough to establish good cause for substitute 
counsel, in addition to the ineffective assistance of counsel allegations. 
In short, a refusal to find good cause for substitute counsel on these facts 
if they are true is an abuse of discretion because it is contrary to any legal 
standard governing an attorney's representation of a client. Nor, with these facts, 
could a failure to find good cause be an exercise of reason. Therefore, Mr. 
Pokorney's convictions must be vacated and this matter remanded for a new trial 
with substitute counsel. 
Alternatively, if we do not take the court at its word that it took the 
allegations as true, then the problem is that the court did not give Mr. Pokorney a 
full and fair opportunity to present his complaints. While the court may have read 
the letters, as Mr. Pokorney stated, it never gave him a chance to discuss them 
(as opposed to a chance to make additional complaints not in the letters). 
Interestingly, it was only when Mr. Pokorney complained to the court that they 
actually did not have a hearing on his complaints in his letters because he did not 
have a chance to discuss them in court, that the court declared that even taking 
every bit of them as true there was still not good cause. 
16 
If the court simply claimed that it took every bit of the allegations as true to 
avoid further discussion about them, then it deprived Mr. Pokorney of his full and 
fair opportunity to present his complaints. In this event, this matter must be 
remanded for a hearing where Mr. Pokorney will be allowed to fully and fairly 
present his complaints against the attorney. 
Finally, independent of the claimed errors above, the court also did not 
apply the correct law. Again, the standard the court used is as follows: 
THE COURT: I will also find that [attorney] does not have a conflict 
in representing Mr. Pokorney in future proceedings. It is clear from 
these letters that Mr. Pokorney has a conflict with [attorney] 
representing him. 
However, that's not the standard. The standard is, is there a conflict 
that would prevent counsel from representing a defendant, or have 
there been statements or actions by defense counsel that rise to 
the level that a defendant cannot, based upon those specific 
actions or comments-cannot have a level of confidence, a level 
of-well, the level of confidence in the defense counsel? 
By that, I mean, though I have reviewed all of these statements 
you've made, there is nothing in those that show to this court-
THE DEFENDANT: But-
THE COURT: Just let me finish. I'm making my ruling, Mr. 
Pokorney. That [attorney], either though statements made to you or 
actions taken by him, demonstrate any bias or prejudice against 
you, the crime that brings you before the court. 
Tr. 9/24/2010, p. 10, In. 4-p. 11, In. 1. 
In short, whatever standard the court is applying is not the actual 
standard, and so this in itself constitutes an abuse of discretion regarding its 
ruling on substitute counsel. For example, the test for a total breakdown of 
communication as described in Lippert, supra, does not require the attorney to 
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demonstrate bias or prejudice against the defendant or the charged crime. Thus, 
the court did not follow the applicable law and for this reason as well, this matter 
must be remanded for a new hearing where the correct standard is used. 
But further as to the total breakdown of the attorney-client relationship, it is 
indisputable that Mr. Pokorney was not just trying to manufacture a conflict in 
order to obtain a different attorney. This is obvious because this is not a case 
where a court denies a request for substitute counsel and the defendant 
nevertheless proceeds with that attorney and then appeals. 
Rather, it is clear that Mr. Pokorney genuinely did not want to be 
represented by this particular attorney (although he did want to be represented 
by counsel), because he not once, but twice, choose to proceed pro se in a 
felony jury trial rather than proceed with this particular attorney. Even more 
telling is that when he discharged counsel before the second trial, he had already 
received a life sentence with 30 years fixed so he knew what would happen if he 
lost again. The breakdown was so great, he nevertheless choose to proceed pro 
se rather than accept that particular attorney. 
To summarize, Appellant first asserts that the district court erred since 
substitute counsel should have been appointed if the allegations were taken as 
true as claimed by the court. The remedy for this is vacating the convictions and 
remanding the matter for a new trial with substitute counsel. Alternatively, the 
matter must be remanded for a hearing so that the district court can apply the 
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correct standard and/or give Mr. Pokorney a full and fair opportunity to voice his 
concerns. 6 
11. 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTIONS 
A. Standard of review 
Mr. Pokorney did move to dismiss for insufficient evidence at the end of 
the state's case. (Tr. p. 479-481.) Even if he had not, Idaho law is clear that the 
sufficiency of the evidence need not be challenged below in order to raise the 
issue on appeal. State v. Faught, 127 Idaho 873 (1995); State v. Ashley, 126 
Idaho 694 (Ct. App. 1995). 
As to the standard of review for this issue, State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570 
(Ct. App. 2007), explained as follows: 
Appellate review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is 
limited. A jury verdict will not be set aside if it is supported by 
substantial and competent evidence upon which a rational trier of 
fact could find all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 
We may not substitute our opinion for that of the jury as to the 
credibility of witnesses or the weight to be given to their testimony. 
The facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are 
construed in favor of upholding the jury's verdict. 
Id. at p. 572. 
6 However, Appellant asserts that under the circumstances even under these 
alternative theories, the better remedy is still vacating the convictions and 
remanding for a new trial with substitute counsel since the same district judge 
has consistently refused to appoint substitute counsel. 
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B. The evidence 
As mentioned above, Mr. Pokorney was retried on five counts of lewd 
conduct. Two counts concerned R.P. and alleged manual-genital conduct, with 
Count I concerning the time period of May of 2003 to May of 2004 and Count II 
concerning the time period of June 2004 through May 2006. (Tr. p. 156-157.) 
Count V concerned W.P. and alleged manual-genital conduct occurring in 
2005 and 2006. (Tr. p. 157.) 
Counts VI and VII concerned J.G., with the first alleging manual-genital 
contact and the second alleging oral-genital contact, both of which were alleged 
to have occurred in 1995 and 1996. (Tr. p. 157-158.) 
The jury could not reach a decision on Counts I, VI and VII, and a mistrial 
was declared to them (and they were later dismissed without prejudice). The jury 
found Mr. Pokorney guilty of Counts II and V, which were alleged as follows in 
the indictment read to the jury: 
Count II: That the defendant, Richard David Pokorney, on or 
between June 2004 and May 2006, in the county of Ada, state of 
Idaho, did willfully and lewdly commit a lewd and lascivious act with 
the body of a minor, [R.P.], a child under the age of 16 years, to wit, 
of the age six through age seven years, date of birth, by 
genital-to-genital contact with the intent to appeal to the sexual 
desire of the defendant and/or the said minor child. 
Count V: That the defendant, Richard David Pokorney, during the 
years 2005 and 2006, in the county of Ada, state of Idaho, did 
willfully and lewdly commit a lewd and lascivious act with the body 
of a minor, [W.P.], a child under the age of 16 years, to wit, age ten 
through age eleven years, date of birth, by manual-to-
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genital contact with the intent to appeal to the sexual desire of the 
defendant and/or the said minor child. 
Tr.p.157. 
The evidence relevant to these charges was as follows. As to Count II 
concerning R.P., at the time of trial he testified that he was 12 years old and was 
in yfh grade. (Tr. p. 185.) R.P. testified that his dad (Mr. Pokorney) had been 
touching him, which he described as rubbing his privates on him. (Tr. p. 189.) It 
happened at night when it was dark outside and would be in his mom and dad's 
room. (Tr. p. 190.) He explained that he would be in there because he would 
get nightmares and go in there to sleep in bed with his mom and dad. (Tr. p. 
190.) He did not remember if he would crawl into one side by one person or 
would go in the middle. (Tr. p. 190.) He did testify that most of the time that both 
Mom and Dad were in bed when he would crawl in. (Tr. p. 190.) 
R.P. testified that he was 8 or 9 the last time the touching occurred. (Tr. p. 
191). He stated that once he was in bed, his mom would leave to go to work. (Tr. 
p. 191.) He would come out of being asleep and realize that his dad was on top 
of him while he was laying down on his back. (Tr. p. 191-192.) His dad would be 
on top of him or to the side, and his dad would not have any clothes on. (Tr. p. 
192.) His dad would put his private (which would be hard) on R.P.'s private and 
his dad's body would be moving up and down. (Tr. p. 192-193.) R.P. would 
pretend to be asleep and keep his eyes closed. (Tr. p. 193.) 
R.P. was unable to say whether it happened more than one time because 
he just remembered the one time when he was 8 or 9. (Tr. p. 194.) R.P. also 
testified that he would always wear clothes to bed and there were times he 
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remembered that he would wake up and his pants would be pulled down. (Tr. p. 
195.) Finally, he testified that he felt weird when it was happening. (Tr. p. 196-
197.) 
On cross-examination, R.P. testified that he came to dad's bed lots of 
times, and it was to sleep with dad, not mom, because he was dad's boy. (Tr. p. 
197-198.) R.P. testified that mom would go to work early, like 6 AM, but he did 
not know if dad would wake up at 6 AM or not be awake. (Tr. p. 199.) R.P. did 
not remember if dad ever threatened him or told him not to tell mom or anything 
like that. (Tr. p. 199.) 
As to Count V regarding W.P., at the time of trial he testified that he was 
15 and was in 10th grade. (Tr. p. 208.) He testified that when he was age 11 (he 
guessed), his dad (Mr. Pokorney) fondled his testicles and penis. (Tr. p. 212.) 
He explained that typically he would get out of the shower and walk through the 
living room with just a bath towel wrapped around his waist. (Tr. p. 213-214.) He 
testified that while walking past his dad, who was sitting at the computer desk, 
his dad would fondle his penis. (Tr. p. 215-216.) While he thought the towel was 
still around him, he was not sure. (Tr. p. 215-216.) W.P. said that it happened 
more than once, but it was a long time ago and so he was not sure about each 
time. (Tr. p. 216.) When asked to describe the fondling, he testified that it was 
with bare hands, and was probably just with one hand but could vary. (Tr. p. 
216.) W.P. acknowledged that he had previously used the word tickling, rather 
than fondling (or abuse) as he was now doing. (Tr. p. 217.) W.P. testified that 
22 
he knew it was not simple tickling because it was on his privates. (Tr. p. 217-
218.) He testified that it was very quick, three seconds. (Tr. p. 218.) 
On cross-examination, Mr. Pokorney asked him: 
Q ..... Ok. Now [W.P.]. you said you were abused. So are you 
trying to tell this jury that I was using you for sex? Is that what 
you're trying to say, that I was getting off on touching my son? You, 
not anyone else. You. 
A No. 
Q. You're not saying that, are you? 
A Hmm-um. 
Q. No. I didn't think so. 
Tr. p. 226, Ins. 1-9. 
Mr. Pokorney continued by asking: 
Q. Those-that touching, did you ever do anything-well, you 
already said we didn't have sex. But what I mean is, in any other 
place, you know, out on the trampoline, when-there was no other 
sexual acts or sexual touching? 
A No. 
Tr. p. 232, In. 24-p. 233, In. 4. 
On redirect examination, the prosecutor asked: 
Q. Your dad asked you if you were here today telling the jury that 
he was using you for sex and if he was getting off on touching you. 
And your answer to that was no; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Tr. p. 236, Ins. 7-11. 
When asked to clarify, it was established that Mr. Pokorney was using the 
tip of his fingers, not his whole hand. (Tr. p. 237.) Also, W.P. clarified that Mr. 
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Pokorney was not cupping his scrotum or touching his penis with all of his hand. 
(Tr. p. 237.) When asked to described what Mr. Pokorney was doing with his 
fingers, he testified, like tickling, but only on his penis. (Tr. p. 237-238.) He 
explained that unlike with ordinary tickling, he did not laugh because it was not 
funny, it was sexual behavior on his penis, and so it was just the location that 
made W.P. not like it. (Tr. p. 238.) 
W.P. testified that he could first remember Mr. Pokorney intentionally 
touching his privates from age nine, and at that time he did not feel there was 
anything wrong with it, but his opinion changed as he got older, and now as a 15 
year old, it is not ok. (Tr. p. 239-240.) 
C. There was insufficient evidence to support the convictions 
It is well established that without proof beyond a reasonable doubt of 
every element, Mr. Pokorney's rights under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments have been violated. See, In Re: Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
Accordingly, Appellant requests this Court reverse these convictions. 
In short, there was no evidence of the required intent as to either count. 
The jury instructions in this case required the contact, whether it was manual to 
genital or genital to genital, to be "with the intent to appeal to the sexual desire of 
the Defendant and/or said minor child." (R. p. 173-174.) Further, Instruction No. 
29 provided that "[a]n act is 'willful' or done 'willfully' when done on purpose. One 
can act willfully without intending to violate the law, to injure another, or to 
acquire any advantage." (R. p. 180.) Finally, Instruction No. 29 provided that "[i]n 
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every crime or public offense there must exist a union or joint operation of act 
and intent." (R. p. 184.) 
As to Count 11, which concerned R.P., as Mr. Pokorney argued below, the 
actions described by R.P. did not constitute a crime because there was no 
evidence that Mr. Pokorney was awake or conscious while allegedly rubbing his 
privates on that of R.P. Thus, there is no evidence that the act was willful and/or 
that it was done with the intent to appeal to anyone's sexual desire. 
To further explain, there was no evidence that the alleged rubbing was a 
conscious or willful act committed while Mr. Pokorney was awake, as opposed to 
an unconscious and unintentional rubbing against someone who happened to be 
in his bed while he was asleep. It must be remembered that R.P. testified that 
his mother would also be in the bed when he would crawl in. Also, he did not 
testify that Mr. Pokorney was awake at any time (he only said he did not know 
whether Mr. Pokorney was awake or not when his mom would go to work at 6 
A.M.). Thus, there was no evidence establishing that Mr. Pokorney was even 
awake or aware that it was R.P. (and not just his wife) who was in the bed. 
Further, R.P. testified that he kept his eyes closed during the rubbing and 
so would therefore not visually know that Mr. Pokorney was actually awake. 
Likewise, he never testified that his father ever said anything so there is no 
inference of consciousness from speech. 
To summarize, the evidence showed that Mr. Pokorney was in his own 
bed with his wife. There is no evidence to show that he was ever awake or 
consciously aware that R.P. had crawled into his bed in the middle of the night, 
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much less that he was awake or aware when rubbing on him. Thus, there was 
no evidence that Mr. Pokorney's alleged act of rubbing was willful. Further, 
without evidence that Mr. Pokorney was conscious of his actions, there could be 
no finding that those actions were done with the requisite intent. 
As to Count V, which concerned W.P., the allegation was a three second 
tickle by Mr. Pokorney's fingertips on W.P.'s penis and/or scrotum. However, as 
Mr. Pokorney argued, there was again no evidence of the required intent, to wit, 
that said contact was with the intent to appeal to the sexual desire of the 
defendant and/or the said minor child. 
W.P. himself testified that his father was not using him for sex nor 
appealing to Mr. Pokorney's own sexual desires by said contact. Thus, the 
requisite intent was missing. Supporting this was the nature of the contact itself, 
which was tickling. While W.P. now characterized it as fondling or abuse, he 
acknowledged that he had earlier called it tickling. 
According to W.P., the only thing that made this tickling different from 
ordinary tickling was that it was on his penis and scrotum, which W.P. testified 
was not ok. But W.P.'s subjective belief that the tickling was sexual fondling 
because it was on his penis does not determine whether this contact was a crime 
or not. Rather, it is the intent of the defendant that it be sexual, and W.P. testified 
that it was not for Mr. Pokorney's sexual desire (and there was no suggestion it 
was for W.P.'s). While the contact may have been disliked and unconsented to 
by W.P., at most this makes it battery, not lewd conduct. 
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Therefore, since the intent element was missing as to each of the counts 
of conviction, there was insufficient evidence to support the jury findings of guilty 
and they must be vacated. 
111. 
THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO ALLOW MR POKORNEY TO 
RECALL AND IMPEACH WITNESSES 
A. Introduction 
At trial, before concluding his cross-examination of the state's first two 
witnesses, Mr. Pokorney obtained assurances from the court that he could recall 
them the next day. However, the next day the court ruled that Mr. Pokorney 
could not recall witnesses for the purpose of impeaching them with their prior 
testimony on any matter on which they had already been examined based on 
Idaho Civil Rule 43(b)(5). When asked why he did not impeach the witnesses 
the day before, Mr. Pokorney explained it was because he did not have that 
material with him. The court said "that's your problem." 
First, the court erred because it based its ruling in this criminal trial on a 
civil rule, and thus applied the wrong law. Second, regardless of the rule cited, 
Mr. Pokorney's Sixth Amendment rights to confront his accusers and to present a 
complete defense were violated by the court's ruling. The only issue was timing. 
There was no problem with the nature of Mr. Pokorney's questions (he simply 
wanted to confront his accusers with their prior inconsistent testimony) which 
could justify a limitation of his constitutional right to confront his accuser. 
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Additionally, his Sixth Amendment right to present a complete defense was 
violated because he was prevented from presenting evidence which was material 
and favorable to him. 
Finally, assuming for the sake of argument that the civil (or some other 
rule) did apply, the court still abused its discretion in not allowing the pro se 
defendant to recall and impeach witnesses since the court had contributed to his 
failure to do so earlier. 
B. The court's rulings 
On the first day of trial, during his cross-examination of R.P., Mr. Pokorney 
said to the court: 
MR. POKORNEY: Your Honor, I want to recall him tomorrow, 
after-I have a bunch of stuff-
THE COURT: Well, at this point, we'll take it up accordingly. 
You can be excused-did you have any other questions at this 
point? 
MR. POKORNEY: Will I get to talk to him tomorrow? 
THE COURT: I'll make a determination whether or not you can be 
excused. If you wish to call him in your case in chief tomorrow, he'll 
be allowed to testify. 
MR. POKORNEY: Okay. I'll do that. Okay, son. 
Tr. p. 202, Ln. 23-p. 203, In. 11. 
The court then asked whether the state had any redirect (which it did). (Tr. 
p. 203.) 
Also on the first day of trial, after the state's redirect of W.P., the court 
asked Mr. Pokorney whether he wished to recall him the next day, to which he 
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answered yes. Accordingly, the court admonished W.P. not to discuss his 
testimony and to report back the next day. (Tr. p. 240-241.) 
The first day of trial ended while Mr. Pokorney was cross-examining J.G. 
Out of the presence of the jury, Mr. Pokorney explained that the next day he will 
be asking a lot of questions from previous testimony and sought confirmation of 
their prior agreement that he call it a hearing (as opposed to the prior trial). (Tr. p. 
284.) In response to the court's question, Mr. Pokorney confirmed that he was 
planning on calling some of the witnesses who had testified that day and also 
intended to continue his examination of J.G. (Tr. p. 284.) Mr. Pokorney 
continued by explaining that he would be contradicting him with prior court 
testimony and statements he made to police. (Tr. p. 284.) The court confirmed he 
can say "prior court proceeding" or variations therefore, but cautioned him that 
there is a time and place to impeach a witness, and that typically is done when 
they are called by the state. (Tr. p. 285.) Nevertheless, the court stated it would 
wait and see what questions Mr. Pokorney would ask and go from there. (Tr. p. 
285.) 
When the trial resumed the next day, the court began as follows (outside 
the presence of the jury): 
THE COURT: ... You had indicated you're going to be recalling 
some witnesses and going over with them, as part of that 
testimony, what they have testified to before in earlier court 
proceedings. 
Rule 43(b)(5) of our Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth that a 
witness once examined, cannot be reexamined on the same matter 
without leave of the court." 
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And so, obviously, if there was-if-- with the three-your three sons, 
if you intend to impeach them about their earlier testimony, that, 
frankly was covered, or you had that opportunity in the State's 
case-in-chief to cross- examine them about that. I'll wait to see 
what you intend to call them on. 
The one witness that I'm concerned about in particular is the 
youngest child that testified. The 15-year-old and [J.G.], the 27-
year-old, I may give you some latitude on that. But were you going 
to recall-what's the youngest one that testified? 
[PROSECUTOR]: [R.P.] 
THE COURT: [R.P.]. Were you going to recall him and ask him 
questions about his earlier testimony. 
MR. POKORNEY: I was. 
THE COURT: Why didn't you go through that when he was on the 
witness stand and that was being covered earlier when he testified 
as the inappropriate touching? 
MR. POKORNEY: Well, because I didn't have the material with me. 
THE COURT: Well, that's your problem. I'm not going to allow him 
to be retraumatized again. 
MR. POKORNEY: Okay. Well, he's my witness too. I'll just do it 
when it's my witness. 
THE COURT: No. You don't-if the subject matter about the 
touching was brought out on direct examination and you had an 
opportunity to cross- examine him about that, that's when you can 
cross-examine him about prior inconsistent statements. 
MR. POKORNEY: Right. I understand that. 
THE COURT: That's fair game. 
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MR POKORNEY: I don't want to cross examine him. I'm going to 
call him as my witness. 
THE COURT: And what are you going to ask him? 
MR POKORNEY: A whole bunch of stuff. 
THE COURT: Well, you're going to lay it out for me now. What are 
you going to ask him about? 
MR POKORNEY: Wait. Rule 607 says I cannot-I can attack the 
credibly of a witness, right? 
THE COURT: You do it on cross-examination, when they've been 
called the first time. 
MR. POKORNEY: Right, but that's the State's witness. 
THE COURT: No. 
MR POKORNEY: What about my witness? 
THE COURT: If you are going to recall him, I would like to hear 
from you-and the State will be precluded from giving him any 
information on this-what is it what you're going to ask him on re-
examination. What is you intend to ask him about. 
MR POKORNEY: I'm going to ask him about his statement that he 
has his clothes off, because in the earlier-
THE COURT: You had an opportunity to do that on cross-
examination. 
MR POKORNEY: So--
THE COURT: That was brought up. 
MR POKORNEY: So you're saying that-before I even call my 
witness, you're telling me what I can and cannot talk about. 
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THE COURT: I'm telling him that you can ask him about-
MR POKORNEY: Anything. He's my witness. 
THE COURT: No, you cannot You cannot bring out prior 
inconsistent statements. 
MR. POKORNEY: Because. 
THE COURT: Because you had the opportunity to do that-
MR POKORNEY: I haven't had. 
THE COURT:--when he was on-yes, you have. And I'm not going 
to argue with you anymore. I'm going to grant-I'm going to order 
you at this point in time-before he's even recalled to the witness 
stand, you're going to outline to me what it is that you're going to 
ask him. And if it's about prior inconsistent statements on that 
youngest child, who has been traumatized twice already, I am not 
going to give you the right to do that by recalling him. You have the 
opportunity to do that when he was on the witness stand in the first 
place. And Rule 43(b)(4) clearly points that out 
Now, with the 15-year-old and the older one, I'll give you that 
latitude because frankly, you're representing yourself. And, by the 
way, you're doing a very marginal job, at best, at doing that 
Tr. p. 287, In. 13-p. 291, In. 12 (emphasis added). 
C. The civil rule and the Sixth Amendment 
The Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure which the court based its ruling on 
provides as follows: 
Rule 43(b)(5). Reexamination and recalling of witnesses. 
A witness once examined cannot be reexamined as to the same 
matter without leave of the court, but the witness may be 
reexamined as to any new matter upon which the witness has been 
examined by the adverse party. And after the examinations on both 
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sides are once concluded, the witness cannot be recalled by the 
same party without leave of the court. Leave shall be granted or 
withheld by the court in the exercise of sound discretion. This rule 
shall not preclude the adverse party from calling such witness as 
that party's own witness for direct examination. 
1.R.C.P. Rule 43(b)(5). 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 
(1967). The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause guarantees a criminal 
defendant an opportunity for effective cross-examination. See e.g., Delaware v. 
Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985). The right to present a complete and meaningful 
defense is grounded in the Sixth Amendment's Compulsory Process Clause and 
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Chambers v. 
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). 
As the Idaho Supreme Court explained in State v. Dalrymple, 144 Idaho 
628, 167 P .3d 765 (2007): 
On appeal, Dalrymple asserts that the district court limited his right 
to present his defense when it refused to allow him to recall K.B. as 
a witness. He contends he should have been able to recall K.B. to 
inquire as to his hypnosis claim. Dalrymple points out that the Sixth 
Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right "to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." Accord 
Idaho Const. Art. I, § 13. Compulsory process "is in plain terms 
the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's 
version the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may 
decide where the truth lies." Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 
87 S. Ct. 1920, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1019 (1967). The right of the accused 
to present witnesses in his own defense is fundamental but is not 
without limitation. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 408-10, 108 S. Ct. 
646, 98 L. Ed. 2d 798 (1988). 
A mere deprivation of testimony does not establish a Sixth 
Amendment violation. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 
858, 867, 102 S. Ct. 3440, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1193 (1982). Compulsory 
process only applies if the defendant can "at least make some 
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plausible showing of how [the witnesses'] testimony would have 
been both material and favorable to his defense." Id.; accord State 
v. Kerchusky, 138 Idaho 671,676, 67 P.3d 1283, 1288 (App. 2003). 
IVlateriality and favorableness are judged in the context of the whole 
record. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 868 ..... 
Dalrymple also asserted that he was deprived of his right to 
confront his accuser by being denied the ability to recall K.B. for 
cross-examination on his hypnosis defense. Under the Sixth 
Amendment a criminal defendant has the right to confront his 
accusers, including the right to conduct an effective cross-
examination. State v. Araiza, 124 Idaho 82, 91, 856 P.2d 872, 881 
(1993). But, as we stated in Araiza, the right of cross-examination is 
not unlimited: 
A defendant's right to confront witnesses, however, is not 
absolute. The trial court may reasonably limit cross-
examination that is harassing, confusing, repetitive, or only 
marginally relevant. Delaware v. Van Arsda/1, 475 U.S. 673, 
679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435, 89 L.Ed.2d 674, 683 (1986). 
Concerning limitations on cross-examination, the Supreme 
Court has stated that 'the Confrontation Clause guarantees 
an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-
examination that is effective in whatever way, and to 
whatever extent, the defense might wish.' Id. (citing 
Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 [106 S.Ct. 292, 294, 
88 L.Ed.2d 15, 19] (1985)). 
Id., p. 634-635 (emphasis added). 
D. The court's ruling was both an abuse of discretion under state law and a 
violation of the confrontation and compulsory process clauses 
First of all, the court obviously erred when it relied on a rule of civil 
procedure to prevent Mr. Pokorney from recalling and impeaching witnesses in 
this criminal case. Given the constitutional rights that criminal defendants 
possess which have no counterpart for civil litigants, the concerns in a criminal 
trial are very different from that of a civil trial. Here, since the court applied the 
wrong law, it abused its discretion. 
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Second, not only was the court's ruling erroneous under state law, it 
violated the Constitution as well. In short, the court's limitations on Mr. 
Pokorney's right to confront his accusers and his right to present a complete 
defense by calling witnesses in his own defense was a violation of his rights 
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.7 
As explained above in Dalrymple, "[a] defendant's right to confront 
witnesses, however, is not absolute. The trial court may reasonably limit cross-
examination that is harassing, confusing, repetitive, or only marginally relevant. 
Delaware v. Van Arsda//, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986)." In our case, Mr. Pokorney 
simply wanted to confront the complaining witnesses using their prior testimony, 
which is something he could indisputably do. While he wanted to do it when he 
recalled them, the proposed questioning would have been the functional 
equivalent of cross-examination, but there was no suggestion that such 
examination would have been harassing, confusing, repetitive or only marginally 
relevant. Therefore, there were no grounds to limit the examination which would 
pass constitutional muster. 
7 Appellant notes that while there are two different Sixth Amendment issues 
raised here, to wit, the right to confront his accusers and also, the right to present 
his defense through his own witnesses, they are just different sides of the same 
coin. While Mr. Pokorney was attempting to confront his accusers through direct 
examination when they were his own witnesses, his proposed questions were 
really of the nature of cross- examination. In other words, he did not finish his 
cross-examinations because he did not have his impeachment materials and 
basically intended to finish them when he recalled the witnesses. Therefore, 
since the court prohibited his recall and impeachment of the witnesses, it not only 
deprived him of his right to present a complete defense through his own 
witnesses, but also deprived him of his right to confront his accusers. 
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The court's limitation on Mr. Pokorney's right to confront his accusers was 
not reasonable or constitutionally allowed because the only issue was the timing 
of the questioning, not the questions themselves. Again, Mr. Pokorney simply 
wanted to finish his cross-examination once he obtained his material, there is no 
suggestion that he was going to ask any sort of question that a complaining 
witness would not otherwise have to answer. The only problem is that the court 
just insisted after the fact that he should have done it during his initial cross-
examination of the witnesses, rather than when he recalled them as his own 
witness. 
The court cited only one reason (other than the civil rule which did not 
apply) as to why the witnesses should not able to be questioned again about the 
subject matter of the lawsuit. The court explained it did not want the witnesses 
traumatized again; in particular, the youngest witness who the court claimed had 
already been traumatized twice. However, the court never makes any finding 
that would allow its generalized concern about the witness to limit Mr. Pokorney's 
Sixth Amendment rights. 
As an aside, the court forgets that its own erroneous ruling (which was 
reversed on appeal) is what caused the witnesses to be called in the second trial 
and, as claimed by the court, re-traumatized. 
Back to the point, the court never explains its claim that the witnesses 
have been traumatized by testifying or would be further traumatized by having to 
testify again about the allegations and it appears to be just a general comment. 
While Appellant is not insensitive to the issues inherent in these sorts of cases, 
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the court never made any sort of finding that could support a limitation on the 
Appellant's constitutional right to confront his accusers on the exact allegations 
being made in the lawsuit. See, e.g., State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327 (2011). 
Next, the court's deprivation of his right to present a complete defense 
prevented Mr. Pokorney from establishing evidence that was material and 
favorable. It cannot be seriously argued that the witnesses' earlier testimony 
about the instant allegations was not material to the instant trial. As to whether it 
was favorable or not, it also cannot be seriously argued that prior inconsistent 
testimony about the instant allegations would not be favorable to Mr. Pokorney 
since at the very least it would impeach the credibility of the witnesses in a case 
which solely relied on credibility. 
There is also a specific example of prior inconsistent testimony that would 
be material and favorable which Mr. Pokorney was not allowed to present. As 
described above, Mr. Pokorney explained to the court (although he was cut off 
before he finished) that he wanted to impeach R.P. regarding his statement that 
his clothes were off because that was not his testimony in the first trial. 8 
But there is more which establishes the favorable nature of the material 
evidence Mr. Pokorney was precluded from presenting. Mr. Pokorney was able 
to impeach J.G. with his prior inconsistent statements (while the court said it 
would give him latitude, it was actually not needed since Mr. Pokorney was still in 
the middle of his cross-examination). Significantly, Mr. Pokorney was not 
8 It is unknown from our record exactly which of W.P.'s statements that Mr. 
Pokorney wanted to impeach because the court cut off all discussion on the 
impeachment topic. 
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convicted of the charges arising from J.G.'s allegations (the jury hung on them). 
In other words, Mr. Pokorney was not convicted of charges arising from the 
allegations of the witness who he was allowed to impeach with his prior 
inconsistent statements. This in itself shows that the other impeachment 
evidence Mr. Pokorney desired to use was material and favorable. This is also 
why the error of the court (whether characterized as error under state or federal 
law) cannot be considered to have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Finally, assuming for the sake of argument that the civil rule (or some 
other limitation on the calling or confronting of witnesses) did apply, the court 
nevertheless abused its discretion by failing to grant leave for Mr. Pokorney to 
ask the witnesses about their allegations since the court contributed to (and 
perhaps largely caused), the problem. 
As described in the exchanges above, when Mr. Pokorney had finished 
his initial cross-examinations of both R.P. and W.P., the court assured him that 
he would be able to recall them the next day. Further, as to R.P., Mr. Pokorney 
was trying to explain to the court the questions he was going to ask when he 
recalled him, but the court just cut him off. It was only after Mr. Pokorney had 
finished with those witnesses that the court advised him that a civil rule prohibited 
him from again asking about the allegations. Had the court mentioned this when 
Mr. Pokorney was trying to explain what he wanted to ask R.P. instead of cutting 
him off and assuring him could question R.P. the next day, Mr. Pokorney could 
have moved for a continuance so as to retrieve his impeachment materials. If 
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denied, he could have at least asked more detailed questions about the 
allegations and impeached him as best he could without the materials in hand. 
Additionally as to the court's role in the problem, as explained above, the 
court gave short shrift to Mr. Pokorney's reason for not earlier impeaching the 
witnesses with their prior inconsistent statement, to wit, that he did not have 
those materials with him. Again, the court said "that's your problem." Yet the 
court failed to recognize how it helped create this problem. 
To begin with, this was a pro se incarcerated defendant who cannot 
simply go back to his office during the lunch break to retrieve materials he 
realizes he needs or have them brought to him. To make matters worse, Mr. 
Pokorney did not know that he needed all his impeachment materials on the first 
day of trial because of the court's actions. 
The first jury trial in this case took four days. At the instant trial, the two 
witnesses for whom he did not have his impeachment materials both testified on 
the first day of trial. The trial's schedule was only discussed at an ex parte 
hearing where Mr. Pokorney was not present. There was a telephonic hearing 
occurring on December 17, 2010, and after the court's telephone call to Mr. 
Pokorney in the jail was terminated, the court and prosecutor had an ex parte 
conversation. (Transcript, 12/17/2010, p. 15-18.) Among other things, the court 
inquired of the prosecutor how much trial time will be required for the actual 
witnesses, whereupon the prosecutor advised the court that she had only one 
day of actual evidence. (Transcript, 12/17/2010, p. 15.) Thus, given that the first 
trial took four days, since the court did not make him privy to the trial schedule 
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and instead only addressed it ex parte with the prosecutor, Mr. Pokorney would 
have no reason to know that he would need everything the first day. 9 
To summarize, Appellant asserts that the court abused its discretion when 
it prohibited Mr. Pokorney from recalling witnesses to impeach them based on a 
civil rule. Additionally, the court violated Mr. Pokorney's Sixth Amendment right to 
confront his accusers and right to present a complete defense. The questions he 
wanted to ask the witnesses were not otherwise prohibited and the evidence Mr. 
Pokorney wanted to present was material and favorable to him. Further, he was 
not convicted of the charges where he was allowed to impeach his accuser with 
his prior inconsistent statements. Therefore, this is reversible error which cannot 
be considered to be harmless. 
Finally, in the event the civil rule did apply, the court nevertheless abused 
its discretion by refusing to grant leave for Mr. Pokorney to question the 
witnesses about the allegations, given the court's contribution to his failure to do 
so earlier. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Pokorney requests this Court reverse and vacate his convictions 
because there was insufficient evidence to support them. Alternatively, Mr. 
9 While not nearly as significant as the court's role in the problem described 
above, the court also led Mr. Pokorney to believe that there was actually some 
chance that the trial may be continued. At the last hearing before the trial, Mr. 
Pokorney advised the court that he had several motions to delay the trial, and 
the court responded that they would take them up on the morning of trial before 
the jury panel is brought in and if there was not a good reason to have the trial 
that day, then they would not have it. (Tr. 12/17/2010, p. 4-5.) While the court 
did hear the motions, it denied them all and began the trial (to Mr. Pokorney's 
evident surprise). 
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Pokorney requests this Court vacate his convictions because of the failure to 
appoint substitute counsel and remand this case for a new trial with substitute 
counsel. Finally, he requests the convictions be vacated because he could not 
recall and impeach witnesses. 
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